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SCOTTISH KNITWEAR MANUFACTURERS * 
JOSEPH F. PORAC 
HOWARD THOMAS 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
CHARLES BADEN-FULLER 
University of Bath 
ABSTRACT 
This article explores how the mental models of organizational strategists determine 
perceptions of competing organizations and responses to competitive conditions. 
We first outline a cognitive perspective for discussing competitive strategy, and 
then use this framework to analyse the particular case of the Scottish knitwear 
industry. We show how the structure of that industry both determines and is 
determined by managerial perceptions of the environment. We conclude by 
drawing out a few general implications of our framework for research and theory 
on competitive strategy. 
INTRODUCTION 
Research on business competition has largely focused upon two issues. First, 
in an efffort to explain why some generic organizational forms succeed and others 
fail, industrial economists (e .g .  , Scherer, 1980) and population ecologists (e.g. , 
Hannan and Freeman, 1977) have studied the evolution and structure of competi- 
tive groups such as ‘industries’ and ‘organizational species’. O n  the other hand, 
strategy researchers (e .g .  , Porter, 1980; Rumelt, 1984) have typically focused 
upon individual firms, with an eye toward explaining why the strategies of some 
organizations lead to competitive superiority while those of others do not. These 
two issues are not, of course, independent. The structure of competitive groups 
partly emerges from the strategies of individual firms. Conversely, the strategies 
of individual firms, both realized and intended, reflect the nature of the broader 
competitive environment. This non-independence means that a complete under- 
standing of competition will be possible only when the reciprocal links between 
firm-level strategies and group-level structures are uncovered. 
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In this article we argue that one important link between group-level and 
firm-level competitive phenomena are the mental models used by key decision- 
makers to interpret the task environment of their organization. Business rivalry 
occurs within a complex network of transactions among producers, their suppliers, 
and their customers. As has been noted by Child (1988) and Meyer and Rowan 
(1977), this network of transactions functions at two different levels of analysis. 
Actual resource exchanges occur at the material or technical level where decisions 
are being made about what goods or services to produce, what raw materials 
to purchase and from whom, and what customer groups to target. At the material 
level, business competition can be analysed in terms of well-researched concepts 
such as entry and/or mobility barriers, the cross-elasticity of demand, product 
differentiation, and pricing. 
However, material decisions ultimately reflect the intuition and cognitive 
constructions of decision-makers. At a cognitive level, business competition must 
be analysed in terms of the mental models of decision-makers and how such 
mental models lead to a particular interpretation of the competitive milieu. Since 
most research on business competition has examined its technical and material 
bases, these cognitive aspects have been largely ignored in the literature. Because 
it suggests various mechanisms to link group-level and individual-level competi- 
tive dynamics, we hope to show that a cognitive perspective on rivalry is a fruitful 
complement to more traditional explanatory models. 
THE COGNITIVE UNDERPINNINGS 
OF COMPETITIVE STRUCTURES 
In taking a cognitivist stance on interfirm competition, we follow a growing 
number of researchers who have begun to explore the ‘interpretive’ side of 
organizational activities ( e . g . ,  Barley, 1983, 1986; Bartunek, 1984; Daft and 
Weick, 1984; Dutton and Jackson, 1987; Kiesler and Sproull, 1982; Ranson, 
Hinings and Greewood, 1980; Sims and Gioia, 1986, Smircich and Stubbart, 
1985; Weick, 1979). The interpretive approach rests upon four long-standing 
assumptions. First, activities and structures of organizations are assumed to be 
determined in part by the micro-momentary actions of their members. Second, 
such actions are assumed to be based upon an information-processsing sequence 
in which individuals attend to cues in the environment, interpret the meaning 
of such cues, and then externalize these interpretations via concrete activities. 
Third, it is assumed that ‘meaning’ is problematic, and that individuals must 
construct actively an interpretation by linking received cues with well-learned 
and/or developing cognitive structures. Finally, individuals are assumed to possess 
a reflective capability such that they are able to verbalize at least the contents 
of their interpretations if not the processes through which such interpretations 
were generated. Taken together, these four assumptions portray human activity 
as an ongoing input-output cycle in which subjective interpretations of externally 
situated information become themselves objectified via behaviour (e.g. , Berger 
and Luckmann, 1967; Weick, 1979). This continual objective-subjective- 
objective transformation makes it possible eventually to generate interpretations 
that are shared by several people. Over time, individual cognitive structures 
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thus become part of a socially reinforced view of the world (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1967; Douglas, 1986). 
The cyclical nature of interpretive activity implies that the material and cogni- 
tive aspects of business rivalry are thickly interwoven. This mutual dependence 
will be a major theme in our argument, and is illustrated schematically in figure 1. 
TechnicaVmaterial transactions along the value chain provide an ongoing stream 
of cues that must be noticed and interpreted by organizational decision-makers 
( e . g . ,  Hedberg, 1981). Through processes of induction, problem-solving, and 
reasoning, decision-makers construct a mental model of the competitive environ- 
ment which consists minimally of two types of beliefs; beliefs about the identity 
of the firm, its competitors, suppliers and customers, and causal beliefs about 
what it takes to compete successfully within the environment which has been 
identified. Given limits to human rationality ( e . g . ,  March and Simon, 1958; 
Schwenk, 1984), not all cues are attended to and interpreted. Thus, the mental 
models of decision-makers are only partial representations of the transactional 
network. Furthermore, mental models are influenced by information exogenous 
to the transactional network such as the idiosyncratic personal histories of decision- 
makers and, as we will note below, the mental models of decision-makers 
other organizations. 
Stintegir 
choices 
factors 
in 
Note: C = Customers 
S = Suppliers 
Cmp = Competitors 
Figure 1. Reciprocal influence of technical and cognitive levels of analysis 
Just as mental models are determined by cues from transactions within the 
value chain, such transactions are themselves partially determined by the cognitive 
constructions of organizational decision-makers (see figure 1). Beliefs about the 
identity of competitors, suppliers, and customers focus the limited attentional 
resources of decision-makers on some transactional partners to the exclusion 
of others (Porac, Thomas and Emme, 1987). Both a supply-side ‘industry’ 
definition (e.g. ‘We’re part of the “consumer electronics industry”’) and a demand- 
side ‘market’ definition (e .g .  ‘We serve the “high-end audiophile mar,ket”’) are 
probable results of this sort of segmentation. The narrowing of attention onto 
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a given task environment means that strategic activities within this environment 
are closely monitored and controlled. These activities themselves are based upon 
beliefs about the causes of competitive success and failure (Salancik and Porac, 
1986; Stubbart and Ramaprasad, 1987). Of course, because of inertial forces 
involving political, informational, and resource constraints, not all activities 
within the transactional network are strongly linked to the mental models of 
organizational elites. Together with exogenous influences, such as the actions 
of governments, macroeconomic dynamics, and the strategic choices of other 
firms within the network, this implies that an organization’s transactions within 
the value chain reflect only imperfectly the mental representations of its key 
decision-makers. 
In Weick‘s (1979) terms, figure 1 suggests that the material and cognitive 
aspects of an organization’s strategic activities are linked together in a loosely 
coupled ‘enactment’ process in which each is determined partly, but not solely, 
by the other. However, at the firm level this reciprocal relationship does not 
occur in isolation of the other parties involved in the same transactional network 
(2. e . ,  customers, suppliers, competitors). Such parties are similarly interpreting 
material cues from the network, and are similarly enacting these interpretations 
through activities within the value chain. Although the interpretations of 
customers, suppliers and competitors are all involved in structuring the transac- 
tional network, the enactment processes of competitors are particularly important 
because they serve to link firm-level and group-level competitive activities. A 
crucial linking mechanism is the creation of socially-shared beliefs which define 
the relevant set of rivals and guide strategic choices about how to compete within 
this set. These shared beliefs establish the identity of individual firms and help 
to create a stable transactional network in which the actions of rivals are at least 
somewhat predictable. 
Figure 2 illustrates this argument. Each competitor is involved in an individual 
enactment process in which the mental model of its strategists is reciprocally 
intertwined with its strategic choices within the marketplace. Because of both 
indirect and direct imitative tendencies (Aldrich, McKelvey and Ulrich, 1984; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) over time, the mental models of competing 
strategists become similar, thereby creating ‘group level’ beliefs about the 
marketplace. Indirect imitation occurs because strategists from different firms 
face similar technical/material problems with a finite number of solutions. Belief 
similarity develops as a result of interpreting the same cues and solving the 
same problems. Direct imitation occurs because of both formal and informal 
communications among the set of competitors. Such communications permit the 
mutual exchange of ideas and concepts by externalizing individual mental models 
in a publicly observable form. The net result of both indirect and direct imitation 
is that the strategic choices of individual firms take place within the context of 
many shared beliefs about how and with whom to engage in transactions in the 
marketplace (Huff, 1982). 
The above arguments bring together and extend ideas from a number of 
disparate research traditions. Oligopoly theory (e.g. , Stigler, 1964) openly accepts 
that consensual and group-based co-ordinating mechanisms are often involved 
in industrial competition. Similarly, strategy researchers (e.g.  , Porter, 1980) have 
commented upon the interorganizational signalling and imitation that typically 
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Note: C = Customers 
s = Suppliers 
Pn - Prducerr 
Figure 2 .  Mutual enactment processes within an industrial sector 
goes on among rival firms. However, in accepting explicitly that competition occurs 
at two interwoven levels of analysis - a material level and a cognitive level - the 
present perspective provides psychological substance to previous assumptions and 
ad hoc observations. In doing so, an interpretive account of competition extends 
the work of institutional theorists ( e .g . ,  DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977) and cognitively oriented strategy researchers (e.g., Huff, 1982) who 
have argued that consensual socially constructed beliefs influence the actions of 
competing organizations. The present perspective expands this view by localizing 
such beliefs in the mental models of organizational strategists. 
Thus, rather than being an alternative to more traditional accounts of rivalry, 
a cognitive perspective complements and fills in the gaps of previous theorizing. 
Despite this complementarity, however, there has been very little explicitly 
cognitive research on business competition, and little is known about how mutual 
enactment processes structure the activities of firms within a competitive milieu. 
In the remaining sections of this article, we hope to provide empirical substance 
to our arguments through a case analysis of a single industrial sector. Our focus 
will be upon Scottish knitwear manufacturers, a collection of relatively small 
firms located primarily in the Border region of Scotland. This particular group 
of firms is an ideal case for studying the influence of shared beliefs given its 
small size, cultural homogeneity, geographical characteristics, and long-standing 
traditions. 
Extensive semi-structured interviews were conducted with top managers from 
approximately 35 per cent of these companies over a six-month period. The 
results of these interviews were combined with detailed analyses of secondary 
industry data to answer three interrelated questions: 
Q1: What are the consensual identity and causal beliefs constructed by 
top managers to make sense of transactions within their competitive 
environment? 
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Q2: How do such beliefs relate to the strategic activities of firms within the 
Q3: ,How are such beliefs maintained or altered over time? 
sector? 
In the next section, we will present a brief background on Scottish knitwear 
manufacturers and their place within the international knitwear industry. Much 
of our analysis will draw from earlier work by Baden-Fuller, Pitt, Stopford and 
Taylor (1987). Following this, we will discuss evidence bearing upon the above 
questions and conclude with a general discussion of the implications of a cognitive 
perspective for research on business competition. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SCOTTISH KNITWEAR BUSINESS 
The production of wool has a long history in Scotland and can be traced back 
at least to the twelfth century (Leggett, 1947). It was at this early date that sheep 
were introduced into the country’s northern islands by the Norsemen and into 
the Border region by the English from the south. The prominence of wool in 
the history of Scotland is probably due to the country’s climate, which requires 
warm clothing and is also quite hospitable to the raising of sheep (Harrison, 
1956). Formal woollen trade associations were in existence as early as the 
mid-l600s, with the border towns of Galashiels and Hawick being at the centre 
of trade activity. In the late eighteenth century, Glasgow traders travelling to 
the Far East began to import finer wools from China, leading to the development 
of Scottish expertise in the preparation of cashmere and its use in the production 
of knitted and woven garments. The industrial revolution and the invention 
of automatic knitting and weaving equipment encouraged the establishment of 
firms manufacturing garments in mass quantities. Some of the oldest Scottish 
knitwear companies in existence today were founded during this period in the 
mid- to late-nineteenth century. 
We include within our target group of firms 17 companies manufacturing 
‘high quality’ knitted outerwear. Table I lists these companies, together with 
their production location and recent performance. As can be seen, a small number 
of the 17 firms are located outside Scotland, in the Midlands region of England. 
These have been included because they share commonalities in production tech- 
niques and general strategies, and because they are typically cited as being 
competitors of at least some of the Scottish firms. Five of the firms are independent 
divisions of Dawson international, Britain’s third largest textile company and 
a leader in the Scottish sector. 
In general, the companies listed in table I produce ‘fully-fashioned’ knitted 
outerwear under their own brand name using high quality Scottish or cashmere 
yarn. At the top end of the price range, garments produced by these firms can 
retail to the consumer for as much as 5450 (approximately $800 US). The least 
expensive garments will retail for approximately 235-40 ($60-70 US). Typically, 
a large portion of the total production is exported to Europe, Japan, and the 
United States. Fully-fashioned knitwear is produced by combining various 
coloured yarns into a garment whose size and shape is determined on the knitting 
machine. This contrasts with the ‘cut-and-sew’ technique where large lots of 
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Table I .  Scottish knitwear firms and their performance (1984-1986) 
Company Location Sales (fm) Export/Sales ROCE 
Barrie Hawick 6.5 0.70 0.32 
Ballantyne 13.5 0.60 0.48 
Glenmac 3.5 0.70 0.21 
McGeorge Dumfries 9.0 0.80 0.48 
Pringle Hawick 29.5 0.40 0.49 
Lyle & Scott Hawick 22.5 0.40 na 
Cooper & Rowe Nottingham 9.0' 0.40' 0.07 
John Smedley 8.5 0.40 0.16 
James Johnson Elgin 8.0 0.40 0.23 
Alan Paine Surrey 8.0 0.80 0.07 
Dalkeith/Jaeger 6.0' 0.40' 0.08' 
Sabre Intl. 6.5 0.30 0.20 
Cox Moore Nottingham 6.0' 0.50* 0.09' 
Robertson Dumfries 3.5 na 0.10' 
Peter Scott Hawick 4.0' 0.80* 0.07' 
MacDougal Hawick 2.0 0.40 0.10 
~ ~~ ~~ 
* Based on 1984 data 
Source: Baden-Fuller et a l . .  1987 
knitted yarn are cut into pieces that are then sewn together to form garments. 
The cut-and-sew technique is faster and allows for a much higher scale of 
production. At the same time, it results in a lower-quality garment and more 
unused yarn, making it unsuitable for the manufacture of expensive cashmere 
products. Many cut-and-sewn garments are produced with neutrally coloured 
yarn and dyed as one piece when finished. Such 'piece dying' permits fast 
responses to trends in the popularity of various colours. On  the other hand, 
piece dying produces garments of only one colour, and thus cannot match the 
intricate and rich designs of knitwear produced in the fully-fashioned manner. 
The transactional network in which the Scottish firms are embedded begins 
with the purchase of dyed yarn chiefly from local spinners. Todd & Duncan, 
another Dawson subsidiary, is a major supplier of cashmere yarn to firms within 
the entire sector. None of the 17  companies spin or dye their own yarn. Labour 
is supplied through local channels. Both tradition and several training colleges 
have resulted in generally high skill levels and technical expertise. Production 
machinery is purchased externally, usually from German or Japanese suppliers. 
A major transformation is occurring in production technology as computer- 
integrated manufacturing techniques are supplanting less automated processes. 
Such techniques link the product design process with the control sequences of 
knitting machines electronically, thus permitting faster product development 
and shorter manufacturing lead times. In recent years, the breadth of the product 
range has expanded dramatically, with each producer now manufacturing 
thousands of varieties of sweaters. The major dimensions along which products 
vary are size, shape, colour and knitting design. From a marketing point of 
view, the latter three are especially important, and the typical producer changes 
about 20 per cent of its product line in any given year to match market trends. 
A few of the larger firms have small in-house design staffs to create new product 
variations. All the firms, however, hire outside design consultants. Finished 
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garments are sold to retail stores around the world by independent agents who 
work on a commission basis. As part of their contractual agreement, agents are 
usually not permitted to sell other brands of knitwear but can represent other 
manufacturers who produce goods complementing their knitwear range (e.g., 
shoes, handbags, men’s suits, etc . ) .  The typical retailers who are customers of 
the Scottish manufacturers are large department stores and exclusive speciality 
shops carrying classic clothing styles in expensive variations. 
From an international standpoint, the total production of the Scottish firms 
in our sample is but a small fraction of worldwide trade in knitted outerwear. 
According to 1984-6 data provided by Baden-Fuller et al. (1987), the largest 
European producers of knitwear today are Italian firms, whose total volume 
of trade is three and one-half times that of British firms, the next-largest European 
producers. The production of the Scottish firms is only a fraction of this amount, 
accounting for about 20 per cent of total British production and only 3 per cent 
of the total European trade. This fraction is substantially smaller when firms 
from the Far East and US are considered. Nevertheless, the Scottish firms account 
for nearly 50 per cent of total British exports in knitted outerwear and have 
enjoyed substantially higher levels of profitability than other British knitwear 
producers, although not quite as high as Italian firms. According to Baden-Fuller 
et al. (1987), the Dawson companies have tripled their nominal output since 1979. 
The other Scottish firms have grown also. The data of Baden-Fuller et al. suggest 
that few of the Scottish firms operated at a loss during the period from 1972 
to 1985. 
In Porter’s (1980) terms, the Scottish knitwear manufacturers seem to be 
following a ‘focus’ strategy by concentrating their efforts upon a narrow segment 
of the retail market. The aim is to sell premium quality, expensive garments 
through specialist distribution channels to a limited number of high income 
consumers. Two aspects of this strategy are noteworthy. First, the strategy seems 
more evolutionary than planned, having developed over several decades in 
response to problems encountered in the marketplace. Ten years ago, the Scottish 
firms sold in fewer international markets and with a more limited product range 
than is currently the case. They have gradually been forced by competing 
knitwear firms to expand both their range and their international customer base. 
Although the Scottish firms manufacture with up-to-date electronic knitting 
equipment, they have historically used traditional, labour intensive methods of 
hand finishing. Such methods permit the manufacture of very high quality 
sweaters, and the pool of skilled workers available to these companies has allowed 
them to exploit fully the traditional methods. On the other hand, traditional 
methods are not as efficient as more modern manufacturing techniques. As other 
domestic and foreign firms began to produce lower cost, higher volume, and 
lesser quality garments, the Scottish manufacturers, intendedly or unintendedly 
used the ‘high quality’ strategy to defend their position in the market. This strategy 
seems to be based upon certain beliefs about the nature of demand for Scottish 
products and the skills necessary to satisfy such demand. 
Second, the cognitive foundation for these beliefs evolved within a culturally 
homogenous and close-knit community of firms. The top executives of most 
of these companies share family and/or educational histories, and have had similar 
career paths within and across firms. The small size and geographical isolation 
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of Hawick, the centre of Scottish knitwear production, has fostered high levels 
of interfirm communication, both formally (e.g. , through the Hawick Knitwear 
Manufacturers Association and the Cashmere Association) and informally (in 
certain cases, the top managers from competing firms live within walking distance 
of each other). This cultural and geographical homogeneity has fostered the 
development of a shared identity and definition of the business as well as a 
consensual understanding of what it takes to compete successfully within the 
business environment so defined. It is difficult to untangle the precise historical 
origins of this shared perspective. However, in the next section we will summarize 
the results of our research by mapping what seem to be the core identity and 
causal beliefs comprising the current mental model. We will also try to show 
how such beliefs influence, and are influenced by, the strategies and structures 
of the Scottish knitwear companies. 
THE HAWICK MIND: THE MENTAL MODEL OF 
SCOTTISH KNITWEAR MANUFACTURERS 
Any discussion of shared perceptions must begin with an important qualification. 
Although social enactment processes inevitably press toward shared mental 
models, each individual manager within a cognitive community has a unique 
set of problems to work out and a unique informational base from which to 
generate possible solutions. Thus, to speak of the mental model of Scottish knitwear 
manufacturers is a bit problematic since variation exists from firm to firm in 
how managers conceptualize the details of the competitive environment. 
Cognitive anthropologists who have studied cultural consensus have begun to 
suggest that it is best to think of consensus as a set of core beliefs that are shared 
by many individuals within a group but around which there exists ‘intracultural 
variation’ (e.g., Garro, 1986; Romney et a/. , 1986). Such core beliefs are particularly 
shared by central or prototypical members of the group, as these individuals 
represent the central tendencies of the group as a whole. This sort of reasoning 
is evident in Huffs (1982) analysis of the interplay of industry-level and firm- 
level beliefs in strategy formulation. 
In our analysis of the Scottish knitwear sector, we took intra-industry variation 
in beliefs as a given. At the same time, however, we sought to distil from interview 
and secondary data core beliefs that seemed to be repeated by our sources and 
widely accepted. Our analyses suggest that certain beliefs about competitor and 
market identity isolate a commonly perceived competitive arena for many of 
the Scottish managers. In addition, one or two core beliefs about how to deal 
with other parties in the transactional network seem to be important determinants 
of both the activities of individual firms and industry co-ordination. It is to these 
beliefs that we now turn. 
Consensual IdentiQ Belids and the Definition of Competitive Space 
It is axiomatic that a first step in a firm’s formulation of competitive strategy 
is the identification of its major competitors (e.g. , Porter, 1980). Two criteria 
have been advanced in the literature to distinguish competitors from non- 
competitors. The industry criterion suggests that this distinction should be made 
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on the basis of technology - firms are competitors when they share similar 
technological attributes. The market criterion suggests that this distinction should 
be made on the basis of product substitutability - firms are competitors when 
they produce products that can substitute for one another in the satisfaction of 
customer needs. Both of these criteria have their advocates, and both are probably 
useful to some extent. Regardless of which criterion is used, however, the 
definitional problem revolves around interpreting cues from the environment 
(cues about technological similarity and/or product substitutability) and making 
decisions about which firms are competitors and which firms are not. 
Despite sophisticated methods for analysing and determining competitive 
boundaries (e.g., Urban et al., 1984), these decisions ultimately rest upon 
the intuition and common sense of managers. To some extent, competitive 
boundaries are arbitrary (Day et al. ,  1979; Weitz, 1985). Managers must 
somehow cut through this ambiguity and frame a competitive arena by classifying 
and simplifying the diversity of firms known to exist. In earlier work, we have 
suggested that this problem is resolved by using cognitive structures which 
categorize firms on the basis of their perceived similarities and differences (Porac 
et al., 1987; Porac and Thomas, 1988). These structures appear to be at least 
weakly hierarchical in the sense that managers make type-subtype judgements 
such as ‘We’re a “retailer” but only “grocery retailers” are our competition’. Our 
earlier evidence has begun to suggest strongly that such statements of identity 
define for managers the perceived competitive space in which they place their 
business. According to Abell (1980), such identities should be the foundation 
of a firm’s competitive strategy. 
The Scottish knitwear manufacturers have defined their business as the 
production of top quality cashmere pullover and cardigan sweaters. This business 
definition reinforces and is reinforced by beliefs about the marketplace. Most 
of the Scottish producers perceive that the ultimate wearers of their garments 
are individuals in the top 2-5 per cent of income groups in any given country. 
The following comments by the managing directors of three Scottish companies 
illustrate this perceptual set: 
‘We’re top-end. We’re not interested in Marks & Spencer’s or anybody other 
than the top 2 per cent in any country’ (MD). 
‘If people are looking for knitwear, the top 5 per cent, we are the segment 
they will look to’ (MD). 
W e  are in the market where customers simply want the best. Pure and simple. 
People must want the best’ (MD). 
This market definition, whether correct or incorrect, is often the first distinction 
that is discussed by managers when describing their business. In the minds of 
the managers, it has both demand-side and supply-side elements. The former 
is a set of assumptions about a group of individuals who can afford to spend 
a lot of money on a sweater. The latter is a set of assumptions about which firms 
in the world are capable of producing such sweaters. It is this latter set of beliefs 
that defines the Scottish knitwear manufacturers as a competitive group since 
it has prompted these firms to view each other as the major competitive threats. 
Some comments by a few of our respondents illustrate this quite clearly: 
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Quite honestly, there is not a lot of competition. The Italian industry is a 
different industry from ours. The Asian industry is a different industry from 
ours. . .Basically it’s pullovers and cardigans. It’s classic type garments. In 
my opinion, it is quite clearly defined that people expect to buy the best 
cashmere pullovers from Scotland. And it can be narrowed down and it comes 
to Hawick, and then you make your choice between the companies that are 
in Hawick which cashmere sweaters you want to buy’ (MD). 
The majority of our competitors are either within our own group, or within 
our own town. . .We don’t try to be high fashion like the Italians. We call 
ourselves ‘classical elegance’ (MD). 
Such comments point to one of the clearest conclusions that can be reached about 
the Scottish manufacturers. From their point of view, no other producers can 
manufacture the kinds of sweaters that they manufacture. Thus, when asked to 
discuss their competition, they focus mainly upon each other, although a firm’s 
specific Scottish competitors may be seen as varying from one market (typically 
defined as a country in Europe, North America or the Far East) to another. 
Knitwear producers from Italy, the Far East, and even others within the UK 
are defined as being in ‘different businesses’. 
‘Textiles’ 
‘Hosiery’ ‘Knitwear’ ‘Lace’ 
/”, ‘Fully- // ‘Fashion’ \ 
‘High ‘The ’Fully ‘Cut and 
quality’ rest’ fashioned’ sew’ 
‘Natural ‘Synthetic ‘Natural ‘Synthetic 
fibres’ fibres’ fibres’ fibres’ 
Figure 3.  Elicited ‘cognitive taxonomy’ of one managing director of a Scottish knitwear firm’s * 
‘This taxonomy was generated with a ‘top-down’ method often used to elicit taxonomic mental 
structures. The respondent was asked to begin with the category ‘Textiles’ and classify the subtypes 
of successively more specific categories of textile firms. This and other techniques for generating 
taxonomic cognitive structures are discussed in Porac and Thomas (1987). 
‘The respondent placed his own business in the ‘High Quality’ category of ‘Fully Fashioned Classic’ 
knitwear firms. Only the four or five other firms within the same category were considered competitors 
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This perceptual focus can best be seen in a ‘cognitive taxonomy’ (Porac and 
Thomas, 1987) elicited from the owner of one of the firms within our sample 
(see figure 3).  This manager distilled his competition from ‘textile firms’ to 
‘knitwear firms’ to ‘fully-fashioned classic knitwear firms’ to a rather small number 
of firms producing ‘high quality, fully-fashioned, classic knitwear’. This small 
group consisted of only Scottish companies. Most of the managers who were 
interviewed spoke about the need to think of companies outside of the Scottish 
group as ‘somewhat’ competitors, and there was a recognition that knitwear firms 
do compete with producers of other types of garments. As one manager noted, 
‘fashion is inherently substitution’. However, such beliefs did not seem to structure 
the definition of the perceived competitive space and were often discussed as 
afterthoughts only when prompted by direct questioning. For example, one 
managing director noted that ‘I suppose in a way that you have to concede that 
we compete with all textile companies because everybody is trying to sell clothes, 
or a lifestyle’. This manager was one who defined his firm’s competition as only 
other producers in Hawick. In addition, perceived threats by potential com- 
petitors outside of the Scottish group were sometimes dismissed: 
I don’t think we have a lot of competition in this company. There is a crowd 
out in Hong Kong that manufactures for Ralph Lauren’s Polo. They have 
copied us stitch for stitch. That is certainly a bit of a threat. But they got 
it wrong. They’ve missed some of the details. . .We are different, and few 
people do it like us (MD). 
The tendency to minimize outside threats is characteristic of a strong ingroup- 
outgroup perceptual bias. 
The Maintenance of Perceived Boundaries: Enacting a Competitive Group 
What is particularly interesting about the rather sharp definition of competitive 
boundaries by Scottish manufacturers is the fact that these market perceptions 
have formed in the absence of systematic and replicable market research. 
Although some firms reported that such research was just beginning to get under 
way at the time of our interviews, admittedly there was a dearth of statistical 
information about market trends and consumer preferences. Instead, managers 
reported that market information is distilled informally from four word-of-mouth 
sources. First, a firm’s agents around the world are consulted periodically to 
assess the trends in particular markets. Agents also convey information to the 
manufacturers through their choice of merchandise each season. Secondly, 
manufacturers contract exclusive design consultants from major markets to 
interpret fashion trends and suggest new garment designs. Third, market 
information is obtained as a firm’s executives travel from country to country 
visiting shops and trade exhibitions. Finally, the Scottish firms track each other 
through informal contacts in trade associations and local communication networks 
within Hawick. 
It is difficult to say whether market information that is obtained in these ways 
accurately portrays the preferences of consumers and the competitive structure 
of the knitwear sector, For example, it is difficult to know whether it is realb 
only the top 5 per cent of wage earners in a given country that buys Scottish 
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garments. However, it is not difficult to see that the range of market information 
sampled by Scottish managers is very restricted. Contacts with retail shop owners 
who are customers of the knitwear companies occur principally through agents. 
These agents are typically selected because their non-knitwear product lines are 
compatible with the ‘classic image’ that the Scottish manufacturers wish to project 
with their own garments. The agents, in turn, contact shops that sell classically- 
designed clothing. Since such shops usually do not carry a full range of fashion 
designs, their merchandise is usually sold to customers who are predisposed 
toward traditional knitwear products. Most of the market information possessed 
by the parties within this network is information that comes through network 
transactions. Given the fact that such transactions occur among a limited and 
preselected group of parties, the network acts as an information filter by 
narrowing the range of market data to that which is of immediate concern only 
to the producers, agents, retailers and consumers. Of course, what is of immediate 
concern is the purchase and selling of ‘classical elegance’, and thus the trans- 
actional network acts to reinforce and maintain the focused definition of the 
business described by our respondents as the selling of ‘classic knitwear’. The 
perceived competitive space of ‘classic knitwear’ is thus segmented from the 
multitude of other knitwear producers, and the major competitive threats are 
viewed as coming from within the Scottish firms. Given the self-reinforcing nature 
of this transactional network, the perceived competitive boundaries probably 
could not be drawn in any other way. 
This enactment cycle is portrayed graphically in figure 4. The self-definition 
as a produker of ‘high quality fully-fashioned classic knitwear’ leads to the selec- 
tion of agents selling classically designed clothes, who are suppliers of shops 
merchandising classic garments to consumers with a limited range of preferences 
for ‘classical elegance’. Market cues from consumers are filtered back through 
informal network channels and provide the Scottish firms with information 
primarily about preferences for variations on classically designed garments. Such 
filtered information is assimilated into the existing business definition, and focuses 
the attention of managers on a limited set of possible product offerings. In doing 
so, both the business definition and the competitive space it implies are reinforced, 
and the Scottish firms use their finite psychological and material resources to 
compete with each other in the fully-fashioned classic knitwear sector. 
STRATEGIC CHOICES 
MARKET CUES 
Figure 4. Enactment processes through the transactional network 
The enactment cycle demonstrates the complex interweaving of technical and 
cognitive factors in structuring a transactional network. The producer-agent- 
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retailer-consumer network has been set up to solve certain technical problems 
in the production and delivery of manufactured knitwear. For example, the use 
of agents allows the small Scottish producer to economize in the distribution 
of its products in world markets. Similarly, agents specialize in traditionally 
designed lines of clothing to economize on time since supplying all types of retail 
shops is impossible. However, each of these technical choices is based upon a 
definition of the business as ‘selling classically designed clothing’. Reciprocally, 
each choice reinforces this definition by narrowing the range of informal channels 
through which relevant market information flows. The result is a competitive 
arena defined by symmetrical mental models throughout the value chain. As 
one managing director put it, ‘. . . the best cashmere pullovers come from 
Scotland. There’s a tradition behind it. People have it in their minds, people 
who own the shops, and they pass it along to their customers. . . The Italians 
would be competitors, but because of the tradition, no one expects to buy the 
best cashmere pullovers from Italy’. Because of the interweaving of cognitive 
structures and technical choices, this tradition locks out competitors and locks 
in the Scottish firms. Because of the joint action of interwoven technical and 
cognitive constraints, they have very little choice but to look inward and develop 
ways of competing among themselves. Such competitive tactics are based upon 
causal beliefs about how to compete within this sector, and it is to these beliefs 
we now turn. 
Competitive Strategy and Causal Belids About Firm Performances 
Spender (1980) and Huff (1982) have suggested that firms within an industrial 
sector develop consensual beliefs (or ‘recipes’) about how to manage their task 
environment. According to Huff (1982), shared beliefs about appropriate 
strategies provide a context within which the choices of individual firms are made. 
For Scottish knitwear producers, the core causal beliefs structuring choices within 
the ‘high quality fully-fashioned classic knitwear’ sector involve consumer demand, 
retailers, Scottish producers and suppliers. These are summarized in table 11. 
Table 11. Generalized causal beliefs among knitwear managers 
Network element Belief 
Customers 
Competitors 
Suppliers 
Retailers 
‘The top 5 per cent of wage earners are unaffected 
‘Scottish companies are not good at fashion design’ 
‘Friendly competition’ 
‘Scottish spinners are the finest in the world’ 
‘Buy equipment for quality and flexibility’ 
‘Minimum order quantity is one’ 
by economic trends’ 
Consumer demand. Since the Scottish firms have defined their market as the top 
wage earners in any given country, there exists the generalized belief that demand 
is relatively unaffected by trends in the economy. Thus, managers view consumer 
demand for their garments as stable. More importantly, consumers are viewed 
as more concerned with ‘value’ than ‘price’. 
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Retailers. A high degree of consensus exists that retailer satisfaction is the key 
to the success of the business. A number of managers noted that a key element 
for ensuring this satisfaction is the ability to produce small lots of almost custom 
garments. As one manager noted ‘We have only one requirement - the minimum 
order must be one’. 
Producers. Since the firms within the Scottish sector are relatively small in number, 
culturally homogenous, and focused upon each other as competitors, a number 
of beliefs have developed over time to make sense of each other’s actions and 
to regulate the activities of the group. One important belief is the assumption 
that Scottish firms are not good at designing high fashion garments. High fashion 
is generally a skill attributed (rightly or wrongly) to Italian producers. Secondly, 
informal norms about ‘gentlemanly competition’ exist to regulate the degree of 
rivalry within the group. Strict price competition is frowned upon, although 
apparently not unheard of, with firms competing mainly on the basis of design, 
service, and quality. Finally, there seem to be generalized beliefs about the size 
and focus of a successful Scottish firm. A few of the larger Scottish producers 
have recently begun to contradict the conventional wisdom of focusing upon 
‘classical elegance’ by developing lines of ‘sports’ garments such as cotton golf 
sweaters. Managers outside these firms regarded such developments with dis- 
dain, and complained that they represent a dilution of ‘Scottish quality’. As one 
managing director noted, ‘The Barries and the Glenmacs are very good because 
they are trying to preserve quality. They are a good force in Scottish knitwear. 
The ‘niggers in the woodpile’ are the Lyle & Scotts and the Pringles who have 
become so big that they’ve lost their direction’. Thus, the perceived prototype 
of a Scottish knitwear producer is a small firm manufacturing high quality fully- 
fashioned cardigans and pullovers. 
Suppliers. The Scottish firms purchase yarn from suppliers around the world. 
However, there is the perception that local suppliers in Scotland are the best. 
In particular, most managers hold one firm, Todd & Duncan, in very high 
esteem, and thus purchase much of their yarn from this one company. Beliefs 
about equipment suppliers, on the other hand, are both shared and apparently 
unique to individual firms. The consensual element is the assumption that 
competitive success in the classic sector stems largely from the flexibility to 
produce small lot sizes consistently over time. Since labour is a small part of 
the costs incurred in producing garments, machinery is purchased not to replace 
labour but to enhance flexibility. Within this general consensus, however, each 
individual firm seems to have a unique set of beliefs about the strengths and 
weaknesses of various equipment types, and thus each has an idiosyncratic mix 
of equipment purchased from around the world. 
As part of the enactment process, this set of core beliefs about the transactional 
network is both a cause and a consequence of the focused Scottish knitwear 
business definition. The belief that high fashion is not the business of Scottish 
firms has defined the perceived competitive boundaries sharply to include 
primarily the Scottish producers themselves. The focus upon traditional designs, 
coupled with informal rules governing the intensity of price competition, has 
narrowed the range of feasible strategic possibilities. Customization via small 
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lot sizes is one such possibility, and causal beliefs about production flexibility 
have emerged to guide activities toward this goal. Attaining such flexibility has 
sustained the narrow business definition by creating expectations on the part 
of retailers that custom variations in classic designs are feasible. Retailers are 
thus able to differentiate themselves from each other by offering subtly unique 
garments, thus creating the demand for even more flexibility in the future. In  
this way, a focused niche for minor variations in classic knitwear has been 
reinforced all along the value chain. 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
In essence, we have suggested that the Scottish knitwear sector exists as it does 
today because the mental models and strategic choices of key decision-makers 
intertwine to create a stable set of transactions in the marketplace. In stabilizing 
such transactions, the mental models of strategists form a critical link between 
group-level and firm-level dynamics. In answer to the questions posed at the 
beginning of this article, we have identified core identity and causal beliefs that 
permit managers to define competitive boundaries and make sense of interactions 
within these boundaries. We have shown how such beliefs both cause and result 
from certain technical choices about how to conduct firm activities. Finally, we 
have suggested that such beliefs are reinforced by a mutual enactment process 
in which the technical choices of firms constrain the flow of information back 
to decision-makers, thereby limiting their vision of the marketplace to that which 
has already been determined by existing beliefs. Although much more research 
must be undertaken to establish clearly the merits of an interpretive view of 
business competition, we feel that the preliminary arguments presented above 
add value to the existing literature in three areas. 
The Existence of Cognitive Oligopolies’ 
A cognitive perspective complements well-known arguments in the literature 
on oligopolistic competition. In such rivalry, firms are known to co-ordinate 
their activities and to stabilize their competitive tactics in predictable ways. 
Our cognitive account fleshes out the social psychological details of this co- 
ordination by showing that it is structured by the interaction of mental models 
and strategic choices along the value chain. More importantly, however, our 
analysis of the Scottish knitwear sector calls attention to the very definition of 
an oligopolistic competitive situation. Oligopolists are competitors because they 
have defined each other as such. But competitive boundaries are fuzzy, and 
managers must mix market signals with existing mental models to make choices 
about who to watch and who to ignore. Within this interpretive process, material 
conditions and mental models become inextricably intertwined. Thus, it is 
impossible to understand rivalry in such cases without attending to its cognitive 
foundations. 
This argument can be taken even further. Uncertain environments create the 
need to gather information about one’s abilities and skills. One way of gathering 
such information is to examine others who are similar to oneself (Festinger, 1954). 
We suggest that the need for social comparison creates an inevitable press among 
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managers to look outward and establish similar competitive benchmarks against 
which they can compare their own firms. Judgements about organizational 
similarity, however, must be based upon a view of the environment and the 
organizations comprising it. Because human rationality is limited in scope, 
such a view is necessarily constrained, meaning that the number of perceived 
competitors must be small enough to define and regularly monitor. Evidence 
presented by Gripsrud and Grdnhaug (1985) and Porac and Thomas (1988) 
strongly suggests that the press to define a limited set of competitive benchmarks 
exists even in highly fragmented business environments consisting of small firms 
with low market power. Within such situations, a mutually defined set of com- 
petitors can be thought of as a ‘cognitive oligopoly’ in that the competitive space 
is being psychologically segmented to simplify and make sense of the business 
environment. When coupled with the enactment processes we have outlined in 
this article, the existence of cognitive oligopolies turns standard economic dogma 
around completely by suggesting that interfirm monitoring and co-ordination 
create rather than result from oligopolistic situations. 
Industries, Strategic Groups and ‘Primary Competitive Groups’ 
This reasoning has interesting implications for recent discussions concerning 
the relative merits of aggregating firms into ‘industries’ or ‘strategic groups’. Hunt 
(1972) used the strategic group notion to explain differences among firms within 
industries, and suggested that such groups have important implications for 
decisions concerning industry entry. Since Hunt’s work, much research has been 
undertaken to explore the nature of strategic groups as an intermediate level 
of aggregation between the firm and the industry (McGee and Thomas, 1986). 
Guiding much of this research has been the argument that industry level analyses 
gloss over important strategic assymmetries among member firms, assymmetries 
that can best be described by determining the relevant strategic groups. Thus, 
major efforts have been made to develop clustering techniques to categorize firms 
within an industry on the basis of obtainable proxy measures of their strategies. 
As McGee and Thomas (1986) noted in their recent review of this literature, 
many of the studies measuring strategic group membership have classified firms 
on the basis of attributes tangentially related to intended strategies. The resulting 
‘strategic groups’ are thus analytical abstractions of the researchers. Such abstrac- 
tions are useful when the aim is to assess similarities and differences among firms 
without regard for their strategic relevance. Such would be the case, for example, 
in developing a science of ‘organizational systematics’ (McKelvey , 1982). 
However, when attempting to understand the strategic interactions occurring 
within and among groups of similar firms, the social psychological reality of 
‘the group’ must be taken into account. T o  do so, however, requires that the 
researcher assess the shared perceptions of member organizations and how such 
perceptions influence strategy formulation. 
Our analysis of the cognitive dynamics among Scottish knitwear manufacturers 
suggests an alternative frame for understanding the grouping problem. The 
clearest conclusion from our research is that these organizations existed in the 
minds of Scottish managers as a group of firms competing among themselves 
and being somewhat protected from other groups within the international 
knitwear trade. We suggest that this consensual recognition is a defining feature 
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of a ‘primary competitive group’ - a collection of firms who define each other 
as rivals. Primary competitive groups differ from strategic groups in a number 
of ways. Rather than being analytical abstractions, primary groups constitute 
the psychological reality for their members. Rather than being purely supply- 
side categorizations, primary groups consist of both market and technological 
distinctions, since in the minds of managers these two elements are inextricably 
intertwined. Rather than calling attention to the material conditions of com- 
petition, primary groups evolve through the reciprocal enactment of both material 
and cognitive conditions. Thus, rather than being purely economic entities, 
primary groups are sociological and psychological entities. Because of these 
differences, primary competitive groups are a fruitful area for further research. 
The ‘Competitive Cusp’ 
Rivalry presents an essential dilemma to the competitive strategist. O n  the one 
hand, strong pressures exist to imitate organizations that have been successful 
in obtaining environmental resources (e .g . ,  DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Hannan 
and Freeman, 1977). At least marginal similarity is required to tap into the same 
resource niches. On  the other hand, relative superiority in obtaining environ- 
mental resources stems from creating and sustaining organizational uniqueness 
(e.g. , Porter, 1980). These dual isomorphic and differentiating pressures create 
a competitive ‘cusp’ upon which the strategist must balance plans for ensuring 
the uniqueness of his or her firm among essentially similar organizational forms. 
Our analysis of the Scottish knitwear companies suggests that the managers 
of these firms resolve this strategic dilemma by utilizing and refining the common 
stock of identity and causal beliefs within the group. Participation in the enacted 
definition of the Scottish group provides a convenient generic recipe for market 
activities: purchase yarn from local spinners, sell sweaters that will appeal to 
classically-minded high-income consumers, create a flexible production system 
that can manufacture garments in small lots, hire exclusive agents around the 
world to market these products, and temper the aggressiveness of one’s approach 
to pricing. In addition to an obvious presence in or near Scotland, these activities, 
and the mental model which drives them, are the price of admission into the 
Scottish sector. Accepting these beliefs, and engaging in the necessary technical 
choices to realize them materially, immediately constrains the possible strategies 
for differentiating one firm from the others within the group. The belief of many 
managers is that the best differentiating strategy is to offer design variations 
on the classic theme that are more attractive than the variations produced by 
other firms, and to do so in a way that maximizes a retailer’s ability to customize. 
Thus, the apparent differences among Scottish firms have to do with styling, 
colour and subtle variations in technology that are believed to give a firm a 
competitive edge. In this way, differences are created within an otherwise 
homogenous competitive group. 
NOTE 
* This research was funded by the Competitiveness Programme of the Economic and 
Social Research Council of Great Britain. Additional support was provided by the Centre 
COMPETITIVE GROUPS AS COGNITIVE COMMUNITIES 415 
for Business Strategy at the London Business School. The authors would like to express 
their gratitude to the managers of the firms who participated in the study. Additional 
thanks go to John Stopford, David Taylor, Kiran Palmar, and Sebastian Green for 
comments and help in the collection of data. 
REFERENCES 
ABELL, D. F. (1980). Dejking the Business: The Starting Point of Strategic Planning. Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
ALDRICH, H .  E., MCKELVEY, B. and ULRICH, D. (1984). ‘Design Strategy from a 
population perspective’. Journal of Management, 10, 67-86. 
BADEN-FULLER, C.,  PITT, S., STOPFORD, J. and TAYLOR, D. (1987). ‘Sustaining com- 
petitive advantage against low cost imports: the lessons from the high quality British 
knitwear producers’. Working paper, Centre for Business Strategy, London Business 
School. 
BARLEY, S. J. (1983). ‘Semiotics and the study of occupational and organizational 
cultures’. Administrative Science Quarterly, 27, 588-90. 
BARLEY, S. J. (1986). ‘Technology as an occasion for structuring: evidence from observa- 
tions of C T  scanners and the social order of radiology departments’. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 31, 78-108. 
BARTUNEK, J .  M. (1984). ‘Changing interpretive schemes and organizational restruc- 
turing‘. Administrative Science Quarterly, 29, 355-72. 
BERGER, P. L. and LUCKMANN, T. (1967). The Social Construction ofReulity.  New York: 
Doubleday. 
CHILD, J .  (1988). ‘On organizations and their sectors’. Organizational Studies, 9, 13-19. 
DAFT, R .  L. and WEICK, K. W. (1984). ‘Toward a model of organizations as inter- 
pretive systems’. Academy of Management Review, 9, 284-95. 
DAY, G. S., SHOCKER, A. D. and SHRIVASTAVA, R. K. (1979). ‘Customer-oriented 
approaches to identifying product markets’. Journal of Marketing, 43, 8-19. 
DIMACGIO, P. D. and POWELL, W. W. (1983). ‘The iron cage revisited: institutional 
isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields’. American Sociological 
Review, 48, 147-60. 
DOUGLAS, M. (1986). H o w  Institutions Think. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
DUTTON, J. E. andJAcKsoN, s. E. (1987). ‘Categorizing strategic issues: links to organiza- 
FESTINGER, L. (1954). ‘A theory of social comparison processes’. Human Relations, 7 ,  
GARRO, L. (1986). ‘Intracultural variation in folk medical knowledge: a comparison 
between curers and noncurers’. American Anthropologist, 88 ,  35 1-70. 
GRIPSRUD, G. and GRQJNHAUG, K. (1985). ‘Structure and strategy in grocery retailing: 
a sociometric approach’. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 33 ,  339-47. 
HANNAN, M.  and FREEMAN, J. (1977). ‘The population ecology of organizations’. American 
Journal of Sociology, 82 ,  929-64. 
HARRISON, E. S. (1956). Scottish Woollens. National Association of Scottish Woollen 
Manufacturers. 
HEDBERG, B. (1981). ‘How organizationslearn and unlearn’. In Nystrom, P. and Starbuck, 
W. (Eds.), Handbook of Organizational Design. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
HUFF, A. (1982). ‘Industry influences on strategy formulation’. Strategic Management 
Journal, 3, 119-30. 
HUNT, M. S. (1972). Competition in the Major Home Appliance Industry 1960-1970. Un- 
published doctoral dissertation, Harvard University. 
tional action’. Academy of Management Review, 12, 76-90. 
117-40. 
416 PORAC, THOMAS, AND BADEN-FULLER 
KIESLER, S. and SPROULL, . (1982). ‘Managerial responses to changing environments: 
perspectives on problem sensing from social cognition’. Administrative Science Quarterb, 
LEGGETT, W. F. (1947). The Story of Wool. Brooklyn, NY: Chemical Publishing Co. 
MARCH, J. G. and SIMON, H. A. (1958). Organizations. New York: Wiley. 
MCGEE, J. and THOMAS, H. (1986). ‘Strategic groups: theory, research, and taxonomy’. 
Strategic Management Journal, 7 ,  141-60. 
MCKELVEY, B. (1982). Organzzational Systematics. Berkeley, Cal. : University of California 
Press. 
MEYER, J .  W. and ROWAN, B. (1977). ‘Institutionalized organizations: formal structure 
as myth and ceremony’. American Journal of Sociology, 83, 340-63. 
PORAC, J. F. and THOMAS, H. (1987). ‘Cognitive taxonomies and cognitive systematics’. 
Paper presented at the annual meeting of The Academy of Management, New 
Orleans, August. 
PORAC, J .  F. and THOMAS, H .  (1988). ‘Cognitive taxonomies in managerial competitive 
sensemaking: evidence from retailing’. Paper presented at the conference on 
Information Processing in Organizations, SUNY, Buffalo, June. 
PORAC, J. F., THOMAS, H. and EMME, B. (1987). ‘Knowing the competition: the mental 
models of retailing strategists’. In Johnson, G. (Ed.), Stratesy in Retailing. London: 
Wiley. 
2 7 ,  548-70. 
PORTER, M. E. (1980). Competitive Strategy. New York: Free Press. 
RANSON, S., HININCS, B. and GREENWOOD, R. (1980). ‘The structuring of organizational 
ROMNEY, A. K., WELLER, S. C.  and BATCHELDER, W. H.  (1986). ‘Culture as consensus: 
RUMELT, R. P. (1984). ‘Towards a strategic theory of the firm’. In Lamb, R. P. (Ed.), 
SALANCIK, G. R .  and PORAC, J. F. (1986). ‘Distilled ideologies’. In Sims, H .  and Gioia, 
SCHERER, F. M. (1980). Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance (2nd Ed.). 
SCHWENK, C. R. (1984). ‘Cognitive simplification processes in strategic decision-making‘. 
SIMS, H.  and GIOIA, D. (1986). The Thinking Organization. San Francisco, Cal.: 
SMIRCICH, L. and STUBBART, C. (1985). ‘Strategic management in an enacted world’. 
SPENDER, J. C .  (1980). Strategy-making in Business. Doctoral Dissertation, Manchester 
STICLER, G. J .  (1964). ‘A theory of oligopoly’. Journal of Political Economy, 7 2 ,  55-9. 
STUBBART, C. and RAMAPRASAD, . (1987). ‘Probing two chief executives’ beliefs about 
the steel industry using cognitive maps’. In Advances in Strategic Management, Vol. 7. 
URBAN, G. L., JOHNSON, P. L. and HAUSER, J . R .  (1984). ‘Testing competitive market 
structures’. Marketing Science, 3,  83-1 12. 
WEICK, K. E. (1979). The Social Psycholosy of Organizing. Reading, Mass.: Addison- 
Wesley. 
WEITZ, B. A. (1985). ‘Introduction to the special issue on competition’. Journal ~ M a r k e t ~ n g  
Research, 22,  229-36. 
structures’. Administrative Science Quarterb, 2 5 ,  1-1 7 .  
a theory of culture and informant accuracy’. American Anthropologist, 88, 3 13-38. 
Competitive Strategic Management. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
D. (Eds.), The Thinking Organization. San Francisco, Cal.: Jossey-Bass. 
Chicago, Ill. : Rand-McNally. 
Strategic Management Journal, 5 ,  11 1-28. 
Jossey-Bass. 
Academy of Management Review, 10, 724-36. 
University. 
